



Recent Advances in Graph Neural Network Robustness

Johannes Lutzeyer


Data Science and Mining Team, Laboratoire d'Informatique (LIX),
École Polytechnique, Institut Polytechnique de Paris

May 15, 2024

Today I present work that was done in collaboration with



Sofiane Ennadir
PhD Student KTH



Yassine Abbahaddou
PhD Student LIX



Prof. Henrik Boström
Professor KTH



Prof. Michalis Vazirgiannis
Distinguished Professor LIX

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Overall Goal: Learn “informative” representations of graph structured data

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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$$\tilde{A}X.$$



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
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
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Iteratively performing the message-passing and update computations allows us to build 'deep' learning models, e.g., a 3-layer GCN

$$\hat{y} = \sigma \left(\tilde{A} \text{ReLU} \left(\tilde{A} \text{ReLU} \left(\tilde{A} X W^{(1)} \right) W^{(2)} \right) W^{(3)} \right).$$

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


Bounding the Expected Robustness of Graph Neural Networks Subject to Node Feature Attacks

Abbahaddou*, Ennadir*, Lutzeyer, Vazirgiannis & Boström (2024, ICLR)

(Graph) Adversarial Attacks


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


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
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
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
$$d_1(f(\tilde{G}, \tilde{X}), f(G, X)) = \|f(\tilde{G}, \tilde{X}) - f(G, X)\|_1.$$

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Let the *expected vulnerability* of a graph function f be defined as

$$\text{Adv}_\epsilon^{\alpha, \beta}[f] = \mathbb{P}_{(G, X) \sim \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{X}}} [(\tilde{G}, \tilde{X}) \in B^{\alpha, \beta}(G, X, \epsilon) : d_{\mathcal{Y}}(f(\tilde{G}, \tilde{X}), f(G, X)) > \sigma],$$

with $B^{\alpha, \beta}(G, X, \epsilon) = \{(\tilde{G}, \tilde{X}) : d^{\alpha, \beta}([G, X], [\tilde{G}, \tilde{X}]) < \epsilon\}$ for any budget $\epsilon \geq 0$.

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Then, a graph function $f : (\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{X}) \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ is $((d^{\alpha, \beta}, \epsilon), (d_{\mathcal{Y}}, \gamma))$ -robust if its vulnerability $\text{Adv}_\epsilon^{\alpha, \beta}[f]$ can be upper-bounded by γ , i.e., $\text{Adv}_\epsilon^{\alpha, \beta}[f] \leq \gamma$.

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Upper Bound on GCN Vulnerability

We consider node-feature attacks on the input graph (A, X) , with a budget ϵ and L -layer GCNs with weight matrices $W^{(i)}$ $i \in \{1, \dots, L\}$.

Then, the vulnerability of GCNs is upper bounded by

$$\gamma = \prod_{i=1}^L \|W^{(i)}\|_1 \frac{\epsilon \sum_{u \in \mathcal{V}} \hat{w}_u}{\sigma},$$

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Insight: Our upper bound on the vulnerability of a GCN is **smaller for small** $\prod_{i=1}^L \|W^{(i)}\|_1$ yielding a **more robust GCN**.

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$$\hat{W}_{k+1} = \hat{W}_k \left(I + \frac{1}{2} \left(I - \hat{W}_k^T \hat{W}_k \right) + \dots + (-1)^p \binom{-1/2}{p} \left(I - \hat{W}_k^T \hat{W}_k \right)^p \right).$$

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Björk Orthonormalisation Algorithm

Given a weight matrix W we iteratively alter it to approximate the closest orthonormal matrix \hat{W} . When $\hat{W}_0 = W$, we recursively compute

$$\hat{W}_{k+1} = \hat{W}_k \left(I + \frac{1}{2} \left(I - \hat{W}_k^T \hat{W}_k \right) + \dots + (-1)^p \binom{-1/2}{p} \left(I - \hat{W}_k^T \hat{W}_k \right)^p \right).$$

Proposed Solution: In our *GCORN* model we propose the inclusion of several Björk Orthonormalisation iterations in each forward pass during the training of a GCN, **yielding weight matrices that approach orthonormality and thereby a more robust GNN.**

Results

Table: Node classification accuracy (\pm standard deviation) for feature-based attacks.

Attack	Dataset	GCN	GCN-k	AirGNN	RGCN	ParsevalR	GCORN
Random ($\psi = 0.5$)	Cora	68.4 \pm 1.9	69.2 \pm 2.6	73.5 \pm 1.9	71.6 \pm 0.3	72.9 \pm 0.9	77.1 \pm 1.8
	CiteSeer	57.8 \pm 1.5	62.3 \pm 1.2	64.6 \pm 1.6	63.7 \pm 0.6	65.1 \pm 0.8	67.8 \pm 1.4
	PubMed	68.3 \pm 1.2	71.2 \pm 1.1	70.9 \pm 1.3	71.4 \pm 0.5	71.8 \pm 0.8	73.1 \pm 1.1
	CS	85.3 \pm 1.1	86.7 \pm 1.1	87.5 \pm 1.6	88.2 \pm 0.9	87.6 \pm 0.6	89.8 \pm 1.2
	OGBN-Arxiv	68.2 \pm 1.5	52.8 \pm 0.5	66.5 \pm 1.3	63.8 \pm 1.9	68.3 \pm 1.9	69.1 \pm 1.8
Random ($\psi = 1.0$)	Cora	41.7 \pm 2.1	46.3 \pm 2.8	53.7 \pm 2.2	52.8 \pm 1.6	55.3 \pm 1.2	57.6 \pm 1.9
	CiteSeer	38.2 \pm 1.3	45.3 \pm 1.4	49.8 \pm 2.1	43.7 \pm 2.2	51.2 \pm 1.2	57.3 \pm 1.7
	PubMed	60.1 \pm 1.7	62.3 \pm 1.3	62.4 \pm 1.2	61.9 \pm 1.2	61.3 \pm 1.7	65.8 \pm 1.4
	CS	69.9 \pm 1.3	73.2 \pm 0.9	76.7 \pm 2.8	76.2 \pm 1.4	78.7 \pm 1.2	81.3 \pm 1.6
	OGBN-Arxiv	66.4 \pm 1.9	46.6 \pm 0.6	62.7 \pm 1.6	63.0 \pm 2.4	66.1 \pm 0.7	67.3 \pm 2.1
PGD	Cora	54.1 \pm 2.4	58.3 \pm 1.6	68.2 \pm 1.8	62.5 \pm 1.2	68.6 \pm 1.7	71.1 \pm 1.4
	CiteSeer	52.3 \pm 1.1	59.6 \pm 1.6	59.3 \pm 2.1	61.9 \pm 1.1	62.1 \pm 1.5	65.6 \pm 1.4
	PubMed	66.1 \pm 2.1	67.3 \pm 1.3	70.8 \pm 1.7	69.5 \pm 0.9	68.9 \pm 2.1	72.3 \pm 1.3
	CS	71.3 \pm 1.1	74.1 \pm 0.8	76.3 \pm 2.1	76.6 \pm 1.2	77.3 \pm 0.6	79.6 \pm 1.2
	OGBN-Arxiv	67.5 \pm 0.9	49.9 \pm 0.7	55.7 \pm 0.9	63.6 \pm 0.7	67.6 \pm 1.2	68.1 \pm 1.1
Nettack	Cora	60.9 \pm 2.5	64.2 \pm 5.2	66.7 \pm 3.8	63.4 \pm 3.8	67.5 \pm 2.5	68.3 \pm 1.4
	CiteSeer	55.8 \pm 1.4	71.7 \pm 1.4	67.5 \pm 2.5	70.8 \pm 3.8	69.2 \pm 3.8	77.5 \pm 2.5
	PubMed	60.0 \pm 2.5	65.8 \pm 2.9	69.2 \pm 1.4	71.7 \pm 3.8	68.3 \pm 1.4	70.8 \pm 1.4
	CS	55.8 \pm 1.4	71.6 \pm 1.4	76.7 \pm 1.4	71.7 \pm 2.9	75.8 \pm 2.8	78.3 \pm 1.4
	OGBN-Arxiv	49.2 \pm 2.9	53.3 \pm 1.4	56.7 \pm 1.4	52.6 \pm 2.5	55.8 \pm 1.4	55.8 \pm 1.4

- Our **GCORN model often outperforms** existing defense approaches when subject to feature based attacks.

Results

Table: Node classification accuracy (\pm standard deviation) for structure-based attacks.

Attack	Dataset	GCN	GCN-Jaccard	RGCN	GNN-SVD	GNN-Guard	ParsevalR	GCORN
Metattack	Cora	73.0 \pm 0.7	75.4 \pm 1.8	69.2 \pm 0.3	73.6 \pm 0.9	74.4 \pm 0.8	71.9 \pm 0.7	77.3 \pm 0.5
	CiteSeer	63.2 \pm 0.9	69.5 \pm 1.9	68.9 \pm 0.6	65.8 \pm 0.6	68.8 \pm 1.5	68.3 \pm 0.8	73.7 \pm 0.3
	PubMed	60.7 \pm 0.7	62.9 \pm 1.8	65.1 \pm 0.4	82.1 \pm 0.8	84.8 \pm 0.3	69.5 \pm 1.1	71.8 \pm 0.4
	CoraML	73.1 \pm 0.6	75.4 \pm 0.4	77.1 \pm 1.1	71.3 \pm 1.0	76.5 \pm 0.7	76.9 \pm 1.3	79.2 \pm 0.6
PGD	Cora	76.7 \pm 0.9	78.3 \pm 1.1	72.0 \pm 0.3	71.6 \pm 0.4	75.0 \pm 2.0	78.4 \pm 1.2	79.9 \pm 0.4
	CiteSeer	67.8 \pm 0.8	70.9 \pm 1.0	62.2 \pm 1.8	60.3 \pm 2.4	68.9 \pm 2.2	70.6 \pm 1.0	73.1 \pm 0.5
	PubMed	75.3 \pm 1.6	73.8 \pm 1.3	78.6 \pm 0.4	81.9 \pm 0.4	84.3 \pm 0.4	77.3 \pm 0.7	77.4 \pm 0.4
	CoraML	76.9 \pm 1.2	75.0 \pm 2.4	77.5 \pm 0.3	73.1 \pm 0.5	75.5 \pm 0.8	81.3 \pm 0.4	84.1 \pm 0.2
DICE	Cora	74.9 \pm 0.8	76.9 \pm 0.9	79.6 \pm 0.3	72.2 \pm 1.4	75.6 \pm 1.1	79.7 \pm 0.8	78.9 \pm 0.4
	CiteSeer	64.1 \pm 0.5	66.0 \pm 0.6	68.7 \pm 0.5	62.6 \pm 1.2	65.5 \pm 1.1	68.9 \pm 0.4	74.6 \pm 0.4
	PubMed	79.4 \pm 0.4	78.3 \pm 0.2	79.8 \pm 0.4	76.6 \pm 0.5	77.8 \pm 0.7	79.2 \pm 0.3	78.1 \pm 0.6
	CoraML	78.3 \pm 0.6	77.5 \pm 0.3	80.1 \pm 0.4	58.7 \pm 0.4	77.5 \pm 0.2	80.5 \pm 1.3	81.1 \pm 0.8

- Our **GCORN model often outperforms** existing defense approaches when subject to feature based attacks.
- GCORN is also effective against **structure-based, as well as combined structure and feature attacks.**

A Simple and Yet Fairly Effective Defense for Graph Neural Networks

Ennadir, Abbahaddou, Lutzeyer, Vazirgiannis & Boström (2024, AAAI)

Problem Set-Up

Problem: Available defense methods often have high computational complexity and training time (often increasing with increasing graph size).

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Solution Approach: We propose a GNN, called the *NoisyGNN*, in which **hidden states are perturbed** by random noise following a normal distribution $N \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \beta I)$, i.e., our GNNs are of the form

$$\hat{y} = \sigma \left(\tilde{A} \operatorname{ReLU} \left(\tilde{A} X W^{(1)} + N \right) W^{(2)} \right).$$

Theoretical Results

Upper Bounds on GNN Vulnerability

We consider structural perturbations of the input graph (A, X) , with a budget ϵ and 2-layer GNNs with 1-Lipschitz continuous activation functions and weight matrices $W^{(1)}, W^{(2)}$.

- Then, the vulnerability of GCNs is upper bounded by

$$\frac{2(\|W^{(2)}\| \|W^{(1)}\| \|X\| \epsilon)^2}{\beta};$$

- Then, the vulnerability of GINs is upper bounded by

$$\frac{(\|W^{(2)}\| \|W^{(1)}\| \|X\| \epsilon (2\|A\| + \epsilon))^2}{2\beta}.$$

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- Then, the vulnerability of GINs is upper bounded by

$$\frac{(\|W^{(2)}\| \|W^{(1)}\| \|X\| \epsilon (2\|A\| + \epsilon))^2}{2\beta}.$$

Insight: Our upper bound on the vulnerability of a GNN is **smaller for large β** yielding a **more robust GNN**.

Experimental Results

Dataset	Attack Budget	GCNGuard	GCN-Jaccard	GCN-SVD	RGNN	NoisyGCN
Cora	Clean	77.5 \pm 0.7	80.9 \pm 0.7	80.6 \pm 0.4	83.5 \pm 0.3	83.2 \pm 0.4
	Budget (5%)	75.8 \pm 0.6	78.9 \pm 0.8	78.4 \pm 0.6	78.3 \pm 0.6	81.2 \pm 0.7
	Budget (10%)	74.7 \pm 0.4	76.7 \pm 0.7	71.5 \pm 0.8	70.7 \pm 0.8	74.5 \pm 0.6
CiteSeer	Clean	70.1 \pm 1.5	71.2 \pm 0.7	70.7 \pm 0.4	72.3 \pm 0.5	71.9 \pm 0.4
	Budget (5%)	69.9 \pm 1.1	70.3 \pm 2.3	68.9 \pm 0.7	70.6 \pm 0.7	72.3 \pm 0.6
	Budget (10%)	70.0 \pm 1.5	67.5 \pm 2.1	68.8 \pm 0.6	68.7 \pm 1.2	70.4 \pm 0.8
PubMed	Clean	84.5 \pm 0.6	85.0 \pm 0.5	82.7 \pm 0.3	85.1 \pm 0.8	85.0 \pm 0.6
	Budget (5%)	84.3 \pm 0.9	79.6 \pm 0.3	81.3 \pm 0.6	81.1 \pm 0.7	81.8 \pm 0.4
	Budget (10%)	84.1 \pm 0.3	67.4 \pm 1.1	81.1 \pm 0.7	65.2 \pm 0.4	73.3 \pm 0.6
PolBlogs	Clean	93.1 \pm 0.6	-	86.5 \pm 0.8	94.9 \pm 0.3	95.2 \pm 0.4
	Budget (5%)	72.8 \pm 0.8	-	85.1 \pm 1.6	76.0 \pm 0.8	79.7 \pm 0.6
	Budget (10%)	68.7 \pm 1.0	-	84.8 \pm 2.3	69.2 \pm 1.2	73.4 \pm 0.5

Table: Node classification accuracy (\pm standard deviation) when subject to Mettack.

- Our NoisyGCNs **sometimes outperform** other defense methods.

Experimental Results

Table: Mean training time analysis (in s) of the NoisyGNN in comparison to other baselines for both the GCN and GIN instances.

Dataset	GCNGuard	GCN-Jaccard	RGCN	GCN-SVD	NoisyGCN
Cora	28.52	1.93	1.16	1.39	1.29
CiteSeer	36.04	1.58	1.23	1.12	1.24
PubMed	731.26	12.27	34.19	4.60	2.41
PolBlogs	18.17	5.17	0.96	0.80	0.65

Dataset	GINGuard	GIN-Jaccard	RGCN	GIN-SVD	NoisyGIN
Cora	48.93	3.12	1.31	1.51	1.93
CiteSeer	58.45	3.78	1.44	2.20	2.76
PubMed	963.58	16.28	41.09	6.33	7.86
PolBlogs	43.7	5.52	0.95	3.71	3.16

- Our NoisyGCNs **sometimes outperform** other defense methods.
- NoisyGNNs are **faster to train** than most other defense methods.

Experimental Results

Table: Classification accuracy (\pm standard deviation) of combining defense methods with the proposed noise injection on different benchmark datasets.

Method	Cora	CiteSeer	PolBlogs
GINGuard	61.8 \pm 0.5	55.6 \pm 1.8	82.7 \pm 0.6
+ Noisy	66.2\pm1.3	58.3\pm1.9	83.6\pm0.8
GIN-Jaccard	70.4 \pm 1.1	61.2 \pm 2.3	-
+ Noisy	72.9\pm0.8	64.9\pm1.8	-
GCNGuard	69.5 \pm 0.7	66.2 \pm 0.6	64.7 \pm 0.8
+ Noisy	72.4\pm1.2	68.9\pm0.9	65.8\pm1.3
GCN-Jaccard	66.7 \pm 0.5	61.2 \pm 1.1	-
+ Noisy	69.6\pm0.9	63.1\pm0.6	-

- Our NoisyGCNs **sometimes outperform** other defense methods.
- NoisyGNNs are **faster to train** than most other defense methods.
- When **combined with other defense methods**, best performance is achieved.

Other Topics We Have Been Working On

- Analysed the **Expressive Power** of a GNN Operating on Paths in a Graph (Michel et al., 2023, ICML)
- Designed a GNN able to capture **Neighbourhood Interaction Effects** (Chatzianastasis et al., 2023, AAAI)
- Studied GNNs for **Text Classification** (Abbahaddou et al., 2023, NeurIPS Workshop)
- Graph Autoencoders for **Joint** Community Detection and Link Prediction (Salha-Galvan et al., 2022, Neural Networks Journal)
- **Antibiotic Resistance** Prediction Using GNNs (Qabel et al., 2022, NeurIPS Workshop)
- Improving GNNs **at Scale**: Approximate PageRank and CoreRank (Ramos Vela et al., 2022, NeurIPS Workshop)
- **Sparsifying** Weight Matrices in GNNs (Lutzeyer et al., 2022, ICLR Workshop)
- Analysing the **Robustness** of GNNs to Structural Noise (Seddik et al., 2022, AISTATS)
- Optimised **Graph Shift Operators** in GNNs for optimal graph representation (Dasoulas et al., 2021, ICLR)

Conclusions

- Graph Representation Learning is a highly active area of research at the moment gaining both academic and industrial interest.

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- Graph Neural Networks are a versatile and powerful tool, that you may want to consider using.

Specifically, with regards to the presented project

- Both the introduction of noise and the orthonormalisation of weight matrices are viable avenues towards more robust Graph Neural Networks.

Thank you for your attention!

 @JLutzeyer

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